




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

***Thursday
27 May 1982***

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CPAS NID 82-124JX

27 May 1982


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
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
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Vitaliy Fedorchuk

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2

USSR: New KGB Chief

The appointment of career KGB official Vitaliy Fedorchuk to replace Yuriy Andropov as KGB chief temporarily reduces the security organization's political influence. [redacted]

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Comment: The move probably reflects a consensus in the top leadership that such a reduction was desirable during a sensitive period of transition. With Fedorchuk's appointment, the KGB is no longer represented on the Politburo. Fedorchuk is not even a member of the Central Committee. [redacted]

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3
The new security chief, a veteran of 43 years in state security, has career ties to President Brezhnev and Andropov and presumably is at least acceptable to both. These ties also make his political loyalties uncertain, however, in the event Andropov should challenge Brezhnev's leadership. [redacted]

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At 63, Fedorchuk is only four years younger than Andropov. While in the Ukraine, he led a vigorous suppression of the dissident movement there. [redacted]

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3

IRAN-IRAQ: Political Maneuvering

Iran probably will assess the impact in Baghdad of the loss of Khorramshahr before deciding whether to enter Iraqi territory.

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Meanwhile, moderate Arab states still are unable to agree on how they should help Iraq and offset radical Arab support for Iran. The Gulf Cooperation Council, which was unable to achieve a consensus at its recent meeting in Kuwait, is scheduled to meet again on Sunday.

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4 EGYPT - ARAB STATES: Reaction to Iraqi Aid Requests

The Egyptians are reacting cautiously to Iraqi and other Arab requests for aid against Iran. []

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Comment: Although President Mubarak has not yet directly responded to these requests, he has said Egypt will not send a military force to Iraq. Mubarak and other officials recognize that most Egyptians--including the military--oppose active involvement in the war and that dispatching regular forces to Baghdad could lead to serious domestic criticism. []

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5 The Egyptians, however, hope that they can exploit Iraqi's military setbacks and Arab fears of Iran to set the stage for restoring normal ties with Iraq, Jordan and other Arab states. Although informal ties between Egypt and the other Arabs have improved since Israel withdrew from the Sinai, none of the Arab states appear willing to take the lead in formally reestablishing relations with Cairo. The Egyptians are still waiting for Rabat to set a date for a planned visit to Cairo by Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta. []

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6 Egyptian-Arab relations probably will continue to improve gradually and informally unless Iran invades Iraq or takes some other direct military action against the other Arab states. In the meantime, the Egyptians will continue to support the Iraqis publicly and sell arms to them. []

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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ZAIRE-US: Strains in Ties

[REDACTED]

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President Mobutu's recent decision to renounce US aid was in part an emotional response to US Congressional criticism of corruption in his regime and Congressional efforts to reduce assistance to Zaire. Mobutu's action also was calculated to demonstrate his belief that the US has not provided sufficient support at a time when Zaire faces its worst economic situation in years and when externally and internally based dissidents are becoming more active.

[REDACTED]

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Mobutu believes that Washington has been insufficiently responsive to his security needs; US military aid has declined substantially since 1977. Moreover, he is annoyed that Washington--unlike Paris and Brussels--has not fully backed Zairian attempts to obtain greater economic assistance from the IMF and other donor agencies. [REDACTED]

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The Zairian leader also resents pressures from the US and other Western countries to undertake reforms aimed at reducing government mismanagement of the economy. He recently introduced some modest reforms, but he has resisted taking major steps because he fears they could undermine his regime. Mobutu's system of rule depends to a great degree on the use of graft to reward supporters and co-opt critics. [REDACTED]

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Mobutu likes to remind Western officials of his government's anti-Communist orientation and its generally consistent support for Western initiatives in international forums. He points to Zaire's participation in the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad as an example of his readiness to support Western objectives. [REDACTED]

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Uncertainty about the readiness of the US, Belgium and France to rally behind him in the event of a crisis probably entered into Mobutu's recent decision to restore relations with Israel. His willingness to take this controversial step, which has led several Arab countries to

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break diplomatic and economic ties with Kinshasa, reflects the importance he attaches to the Israeli security assistance that he has been receiving since early this year. [REDACTED]

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Economic Slide

1/2 Zaire's economic problems stem to a considerable degree from depressed world prices for copper, cobalt and diamonds. Export earnings were down 40 percent in the first quarter of 1982, resulting in a severe foreign exchange shortage. Longstanding government mismanagement and corruption are other key factors in the country's poor economic performance. [REDACTED]

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1/2 Foreign assistance also has fallen off. Last fall, the IMF suspended disbursements under a three-year, \$1.1 billion loan because of Zaire's failure to comply with limitations on government spending and domestic credit. The loss of this assistance has aggravated Zaire's difficulties in repaying official and private creditors and has made them even more reluctant to extend new loans. [REDACTED]

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Security and Political Problems

1/5 Mobutu has become increasingly preoccupied with security and anxious to obtain substantial new foreign support. Angolan- and Zambian-based rebels who invaded Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978 reportedly have been caching weapons there in recent months. [REDACTED]

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1/5 Although the rebels lack unity and have yet to receive large quantities of arms reportedly promised by the USSR, the poorly armed and disciplined Zairian armed forces probably would be unable to counter a guerrilla campaign. Unrest in mineral-rich Shaba could cripple the economy, touch off widespread unrest and threaten to bring down the regime. [REDACTED]

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1 Mobutu also is deeply concerned about growing criticism of his rule from a number of prominent politicians, some of whom have been detained for trying to form an opposition party. In addition, he is sensitive to continued efforts by exiles, including former Prime Minister Nguza, to undermine Western support for his government. [redacted]

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6 As his problems have grown, Mobutu has come to rely more and more on a narrow coterie of corrupt advisers from his own home region. They play on the President's fears and feed him self-serving advice. [redacted]

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Prospects

1
2 Zaire's economic problems almost certainly will worsen in the next few months, and Mobutu is likely to increase his criticism of the US, other Western countries and international financial institutions for failing to do more. New strains in relations with the US could arise even sooner if Kinshasa fails to repay Washington some \$10 million in arrears on aid debts. [redacted]

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6
9 The absence of substantial new foreign aid will create greater hardship for many of the country's 28 million people. Although most of the population already lives at the subsistence level, prolonged shortages of food and fuel could lead to major disorders in Kinshasa and other cities and a revival of secessionist sentiment. In such a situation, Mobutu would be likely to swallow his pride and call again on the US and other Western countries to come to his rescue. [redacted]

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